India China border crisis

China has adopted a new land border law amid continued stand off between Indian and Chinese militaries in eastern Ladakh.

China’s border law

• govern how Beijing guards its 22,000-km long land border that it shares with 14 countries, including India, Russia, North Korea and Bhutan.
• state shall take measures to safeguard territorial integrity and land boundaries. For this PLA shall carry out border duties including organising drills and resolutely prevent, stop and combat invasion, encroachment, provocation and other acts.
• The state shall take measures to support economic and social development in border areas.

Concerns for India

• Experts say that the law would formalise some of China’s recent actions in disputed territories with both India and Bhutan, including the PLA’s massing of troops in forward areas along the India border and multiple transgressions across the LAC.
• The passing of the law coincides with increased Chinese activity along the land borders, which have mirrored actions in disputed waters in the East and South China Sea.
• China in recent years has been strengthening border infrastructure, including the establishment of air, rail and road networks, launching bullet train in Tibet which extends up to Arunachal Pradesh border, and the construction of new frontier villages along the border with Bhutan.
• Guns, Germs ne Steel Crisis from Jared Diamond’s classic Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies. There are Chinese “guns” on the borders. There are coronavirus “germs” in our bodies. There are “steel” makers and other business­ es on the verge of bankruptcy. Might lead to 4th junk crisis when ratings agency with downgrade India’s rating to junk category. 

India- China Border Dispute

• border is not clearly demarcated throughout and there is no mutually agreed Line of Actual Control (LAC). India considers the LAC to be 3,488 km long, while the Chinese consider it to be only around 2,000 km.
• LAC three sectors, viz. Western, Middle and Eastern
• boundary dispute in the Western Sector (Ladakh) pertains to the Johnson Line by the British in the 1860s that extended up to Kunlun Mountains and put Aksai Chin in princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. China, instead accepts McDonald Line which puts Aksai Chin under its control
• Middle Sector (Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand) LAC is the least controversial except for the precise alignment to be followed in the Barahoti plains.
• Eastern Sector (Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim) McMahon Line (in Arunachal Pradesh) decided in 1914. Tawang tract claimed by China was taken over by India in 1951.

Reasons for Current standoff

• 
• Infrastructure Development along the LAC: a strategic military-use road Darbuk Shlok- Daulat Beg Oldie Road, “DS-DBO road” facilitates the lateral movement of Indian forces along the western sector, reducing travel time by 40%.
• India expects to complete a network of feeder roads to the LAC by 2022.
• Shadow of Dokalam Episode: 2017 India’s strong opposition had prevented China from extending a track in the contested area
• Reorganisation of Jammu and Kashmir: China protested against the formation of new Union Territory of Ladakh and accused India of trying to transform the LAC unilaterally
• Global backlash against China for mishandling of COVID-19
• India’s assuming a leadership role at the World Health Organization As the head of the 34-member executive board, the Indian nominee will have considerable weight in administrative decisions and policies of WHO which is already being criticised for poor handling of COVID-19 under China’s influence.
• Signs of new Chinese aggressiveness: along the Sino-Indian border, new security law to control Hong Kong, enunciation of new administrative structures in the South China Sea, new language on Taiwanese reunification
• Growing India-US bonhomie: While China is engaged in a trade war with US and opposition over its actions in South China Sea, Hong Kong, and current COVID-19.

Why a full-blown Sino-Indian war in unlikely?

• Nature of the dispute and the lack of ideological fundamentalism - India and China do not see each other through an ideological lens. India’s long-term strategy is to retain its strategic autonomy, and pursue alignments based “on issues, not ideology.”
• Willingness for diplomatic engagement at the military and political levels – as was the case in 2015 Ladakh and 2017 Doklam crisis. Both sides have reiterated the intention to de-escalate the current stand-off based on the already signed agreements.
• Element of ambiguity surrounding the details of the stand-off - The ability of both governments to manage national media, and the inscrutability of the facts related to the dispute, aided efforts to manage domestic audience.
• Material costs of limited war for both parties far outweigh potential gains
• For China, conflict on the border with India would diminish its ability to meet security challenges in the South China Sea, thus making it vulnerable to the United States, which Beijing considers its primary security competitor. It seems unlikely that Beijing would want to risk a two-front war. Additionally, reputational damages suffered due to COVID-19 and pre-existing fears surrounding China’s rise will all temper Beijing’s pre-emptive use of military force.
• For India, the primary security challenge remains Pakistan-based terrorist infiltration on the Kashmir border. More importantly, beyond the protection of vital strategic points, the vast tracts of disputed land along the LAC do not hold any important material resources such as oil, precious mineral reserves. The benefits of territorial aggrandizement are therefore, limited to deterrence value. 
• The current crisis unfolding along the LAC appears on one level to be a continuation of the trends witnessed in foregoing years. But this time, encounters are occurring at multiple locations along the LAC which suggests a high degree of Chinese premeditation and approval for its military’s activities from the very top.  

Border Dispute Settlement Mechanism 

• 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the LAC
• 1996 Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field Along the LAC
• 2005 Protocol on Modalities for the Implementation of Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field Along the LAC
• 2012 Agreement on the Establishment of a Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs
• 2013 Border Defense Cooperation Agreement.
• These agreements provide a modus operandi for diplomatic engagement at the military and political levels, as well as a set of “status quo” commitments both sides can return to in case of escalation

India hosted the 6th India-China Strategic Economic Dialogue.

• Chinese cyberbullying of a Thai film star spawned a new “Milk Tea Alliance” to forge solidar­ity between Taiwanese, Hong Kon­ gers, and Southeast Asians online. Overtly rejecting China’s attempts to play up support for the “One China” principle, online suppor­ ters quickly propelled a hashtag that translates as “Milk Tea Is Thicker than Blood” to nearly one million tweets in a matter of days evidence of “pan­Asian solidarity that opposes all forms of authoritarianism”.
• Asian multilateralism has often been born out of crises. Chiang Mai Initiative — a financial swap mechanism between China, Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asia — emerged in the aftermath of the late 1990s financial crisis.
• Mutual agreements signed were on Policy Coordination, Infrastructure, High-Tech, Resource Conservation and Environmental Protection, Energy and Pharmaceuticals. 
• In 1987, GDP (Nominal) of both countries was almost equal. But in 2019, China's GDP is 4.78 times greater than India.On ppp basis, GDP of China is 2.38x of India. China crossed $1 trillion mark in 1998 while India crossed 9 year later in 2007 at exchange rate basis.
• Political: 1984 India and China entered Trade Agreement with the status of Most Favored Nation (MFN).  1992 that the India and China got involved in a full-fledged bilateral trade relation and double Taxation Agreement was signed in 1994.
• Bangkok Agreement 2003, both offered some trade preferences to each other. In 2003, India and China agreement to initiate open border trade via the Silk Route.
• Chinese forays in Indian neighbourhood
• Pakistan- China is working on China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which even passes through the Indian territory under Pakistan’s occupation. Chinese presence is there on Gwadar port.
• Bangladesh- As a member of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Bangladesh has seen an influx of Chinese investment in recent times. China has become Bangladesh’s top source for arms imports. Chinese presence is there on Chittagong port.
• Sri Lanka- China has donated a frigate to the Sri Lankan Navy, credit to procure China-made counterinsurgency equipment among other areas. Chinese presence is there on Hambantota Port.
• Maldives- China owns around 70 per cent of the Maldives’ debt. Maldives signed China's Belt and Road Initiative, changed laws to lease out several prime islands to China, and allowed Beijing to build an observation post in Makunudhoo, which is not far from India
• Myanmar- There is a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership between both countries. Chinese presence is there on Cocos Island.

Challenges in economic relations

• China’s protectionist policies: hinder the ability of Indian companies to enter Chinese markets. 
• trade deficit of $51.11 billion USD with China signifies India’s inability to compete with Chinese manufactured goods.
• Lack of Market Access
• Land acquisition challenges: Due to which some of the Chinese projects have moved slowly.
• China’s Belt and road initiative: After India boycotted the BRI summit for the second time in a row, China tried to rope in India to his Belt and Road Initiative with vows to prevent debt risks.

Way forward

• China’s vast size, its growing middle class, and its bid to move towards a domestic consumption-based economy mean it offers great potential as a future market for Indian goods and services as well as a source of greater investments.
• stronger India-China economic relationship can be beneficial for both as India plans to strengthen its industrial sector and China plans to move up the value chain in its manufacturing sector.
• Investment by China in Indian firms provides them with much-needed capital to scale up their capabilities while China gains greater technological skills in sectors such as IT as well as other legal, consulting, and marketing services.
• create an ease atmosphere of confidence in which they can collaborate together and strengthen their relations.
• West’s declining capacity and inclination to responsibly manage international and Asian affairs are thrusting India and China into new order roles that require coordination and cooperation to preserve global stability and co-develop new governance institutions and norms.
• complexity of India-China relations in the period leading up to 2017 manifested in terms of boundary dispute and Dokalam standoff, the Belt and Road Initiative, Indian bid for membership to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and China’s presence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region.
• Mamallapuram informal summit 2019 after 2018 Wuhan summit. Wuhan 1.0 was built on five pillars
• simultaneous emergence of India and China”, two major powers with independent foreign policies is a reality.
• relationship has become “a positive factor for stability” in the global power flux.
• Both sides recognise the “importance of respecting each other’s sensitivities, concerns and aspirations”.
• Both provide “strategic guidance to their respective militaries” to manage the border peacefully.
• Both strive for “greater consultation on all matters of common interest”, which includes building a real “developmental partnership”.
• From Wuhan to Mamallapuram - Convergence of Interests towards Informal Summit
• India’s Interests: allows India to stand on par with more powerful neighbor and discuss issues in a setting where there is no pressure of deliverables. helps to control the latest escalations in the diplomatic relations with China
• take the Sino-Indian conversation away from the immediate divergences on Kashmir and Pakistan
• New Delhi now has a more realistic appraisal of China which demands reciprocity from Beijing.
• China’s Interest: importance of engaging India to avoid unanticipated pitfalls in the relationship.
• current trade war between the US and China will and presumably weighs on Beijing to limit the number of frictional relationships in its foreign policy.
• China would need partners which can help it alleviate some of these challenges
• India emerging economic power both with the heft and credibility to shape the global economic architecture in partnership with the West. 

Thus, India must be proactive to resist any Chinese transgressions and at the same time utilise its diplomatic skills to tone down the tensions.